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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial analysts are required to disclose conflicts of interest (COI) in their research reports, but 
there is limited evidence on the effectiveness of COI disclosures. We investigate whether the 
influence of disclosing COI in analyst reports on investors' decision making depends on investment 
horizon. Experimental results show that short-term investors who view a COI disclosure are 
significantly less willing to invest in the recommended stock compared to short-term investors 
who do not view such a disclosure, while the presence of a COI disclosure does not significantly 
affect long-term investors’ willingness to invest. Results further demonstrate that the COI 
disclosure decreases short-term investors’ willingness to invest by reducing their perception of 
analysts’ trustworthiness and expertness. This study provides evidence on when and how the COI 
disclosure can influence investors’ behavior and enhances our understanding of investors’ 
reactions to cautionary disclaimers.   
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Are Investors Warned by Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest?  
The Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial analysts are important financial intermediaries in capital markets. Conflicts of 
interest (COI) may arise when financial analysts’ interests align with the companies they cover 
rather than with the investors they advise. Analysts’ COI may compromise their independence in 
providing equity research and have been a serious concern to regulators, investors, and 
researchers. 1 Following a series of regulatory reforms, including the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) Rule 2711, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 472, and the 
Global Research Analyst Settlement (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2003; 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2012), sell-side analysts are now mandated to disclose 
any COI they have in their research reports.  
The regulators’ intent with such a mandatory disclosure requirement is to alert investors, 
particularly nonprofessional investors,2 to analysts’ COI and provide the investors with better 
information concerning the limitations of analyst research (SEC 2003, 2010; GAO 2012). Prior 
evidence shows that nonprofessional investors are at a higher risk of over-relying on positive 
forward-looking statements than professional investors (Asay and Hales 2018), and that they tend 
to be credulous about analysts’ recommendations (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007). It is 
commonly believed that COI disclosures can attenuate the unwanted consequences of COI by 
making individuals aware of the potential bias in expert advice (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 
1978; Crockett, Harris, Mishkin, and White 2003). However, there is little evidence that the 
                                                 
1 See Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) and Bradshaw (2011) for a comprehensive review of this issue. 
2 “Individual investors,” “nonprofessional investors,” and “retail clients” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
Nonprofessional investors are investors who manage their own equity investments (Barber and Odean 2000).  
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presence of a COI disclosure effectively influences individual investors’ behaviors (Kelly, Low, 
Tan, and Tan 2012).  
We seek to shed light on this issue by investigating how investment horizon influences the 
effectiveness of COI disclosures on nonprofessional investors’ investment decisions. Investment 
horizon refers to the length of time that investors plan to hold an investment and realize the 
investment returns; it is generally grouped into two categories: short-term or long-term time 
horizons. Individual investors exhibit diverse investment horizons ranging from days to years 
(Barber and Odean 2000), and investment horizon is a crucial factor for investors when they make 
investments in capital markets (CFA Institute 2013).3  
Based on the well-documented “construal fit” effect in Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
(Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2000, 2003, 2010), we predict that investment 
horizon will moderate the effectiveness of COI disclosure. CLT posits that people construe or 
mentally represent objects and events at either a high or low level. Individuals construing at a high 
level tend to put more weight on information associated with high-level features (e.g., central and 
primary information) and those construing at a low level tend to put more weight on information 
associated with low-level features (e.g., peripheral and secondary information). Thus, a piece of 
information is most influential in decision making when its construal-level features match the 
decision makers’ mental construal levels (Petty and Wegener 1998; Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, 
and Liberman 2008; Lee, Keller, and Sternthal 2009).  
                                                 
3 According to Barber and Odean (2000) who study individual investors in a large U.S. discount brokerage firm, 
individual investors on average purchase 6.49 percent and sell 6.34 percent of their stock portfolio each month. The 
annual turnover rate is about 75 percent, which translates into an average holding period of 16 months (Barber and 
Odean 2013, 1539). In this paper, we consider that stocks are bought over a short horizon if investors trade them within 
one week, consistent with prior studies (Barber and Odean 2000; Kaniel, Saar, and Titman 2008; Andrade, Chang, and 
Seasholes 2008).  
 3 
When an analyst issues a report with both a stock recommendation4 and a COI disclosure, 
the stock recommendation represents the relatively central and primary feature of the analyst report 
because it is the key message that the analyst intends to convey, while the COI disclosure 
represents a relatively peripheral and secondary feature of the analyst report because it points to 
the potential bias of the recommendation and is only meaningful in the presence of the stock 
recommendation (Trope and Liberman 2010). Investment horizon may influence the effectiveness 
of the COI disclosure because it affects investors’ construal-level mindset and thus generates the 
“construal fit” effect with the COI disclosure. Prior research shows that individuals with a proximal 
(distal) temporal perspective tend to form a low-level (high-level) construal mindset that carries 
over to their evaluations of other objects and events (Kivetz and Tyler 2007; Rogers and Bazerman 
2008; Fujita et al. 2008; Weisner 2015; White 2017). Investors with a short (long) investment 
horizon arguably hold a proximal (distal) temporal perspective, which activates a low-level (high-
level) construal mindset that carries over to their evaluation of the analyst report. Since the COI 
disclosure represents a relatively secondary feature that fits a low-level construal mindset, short-
horizon investors are likely to place more weight on the COI disclosure than long-horizon 
investors, which in turn affects their investment intention. This line of reasoning suggests that 
investment horizon moderates the effectiveness of the COI disclosure. Specifically, given a 
favorable stock recommendation, the presence of a COI disclosure is more likely to decrease 
investors’ willingness to invest in the recommended stock when the investment horizon is short 
                                                 
4 Analysts’ stock recommendations are conventionally classified into “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” “Hold,” “Underperform,” 
and “Sell.” We focus on analyst reports with favorable stock recommendations (i.e., “Strong Buy” or “Buy”) for two 
reasons. First, prior studies reveal that more than 95 percent of the analysts’ stock recommendations are positive or 
neutral (i.e., they are “Strong Buy,” “Buy,” or “Hold”) (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007). Favorable stock 
recommendations remain the most common type of stock recommendations even after the Global Research Analyst 
Settlement (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach 2009). Second, regulators are particularly concerned about analysts 
who optimistically bias their stock recommendations (i.e., issue favorable stock recommendations when they should 
not) due to their COI. Prior research finds that analysts who are more likely to have COI (e.g., affiliated analysts) bias 
the stock recommendations more (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007, 2014). 
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than when it is long. 
We conduct a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment to test our prediction. Given our interest 
in nonprofessional investors, we recruit participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 
an online labor market, as prior studies suggest that the background of MTurk workers represents 
that of nonprofessional investors (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce, Miller and Winchel 2015; 
Farrell, Grenier, and Leiby 2017; Asay and Hales 2018). In the experiment, participants indicate 
investment intention based on the financial information of a hypothetical company and an analyst 
report with a “Strong Buy” recommendation. We manipulate the presence or absence of the COI 
disclosure in the analyst report and the investment horizon as short-term or long-term. Consistent 
with our expectation, results show that the presence of a COI disclosure significantly reduces 
participants’ willingness to invest in the recommended stock when they make a short-term 
investment. In contrast, participants making a long-term investment exhibit no significant 
difference in willingness to invest regardless of the presence of the COI disclosure.  
To examine the psychological mechanisms underlying the moderating effect of investment 
horizon, we test whether investors’ perception of source trustworthiness and expertness, the two 
critical dimensions of source credibility (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 
1953), mediate the moderating effect of investment horizon. As predicted, results show that when 
investment horizon is short-term, participants presented with a COI disclosure view the analyst as 
less trustworthy and having a lower level of expertise than participants who are not presented with 
the COI disclosure. In comparison, participants in the long-term investment conditions do not 
exhibit significant differences in their perception of trustworthiness and expertness regardless of 
the presence of the COI disclosure.  
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Our paper contributes to research that examines how cautionary disclaimers influence 
nonprofessional investors’ decisions. While prior studies primarily focus on the cautionary 
disclaimers made by managers when providing forward-looking statements (e.g., Johnson, 
Kasznik, and Nelson 2002; Nelson and Pritchard 2007; Asay and Hales 2018), our study sheds 
light on the effect of cautionary disclaimers made by potentially biased third-party information 
intermediaries. We find that presenting COI disclosures in the analyst reports is more likely to 
reduce nonprofessional investors’ willingness to invest when they are making short-term 
investments and that perceived trustworthiness and expertness, as dimensions of source credibility, 
function as the psychological channels that mediate the moderating effect of investment horizon 
on the effectiveness of the COI disclosure. 
In addition, our research adds to the discussion of the economic consequences of 
mandatory COI disclosures. While the mixed findings from prior work (e.g., Cain, Loewenstein, 
and Moore 2005; Church and Kuang 2009; Taha and Petrocelli 2014) indicate that COI disclosures 
do not always influence individuals’ behavior effectively, the boundaries are largely under-
researched. We identify and test a theory-motivated boundary condition and the underlying 
psychological mechanisms. Our findings enhance the understanding of when and how COI 
disclosures can effectively influence nonprofessional investors’ investment decisions. Importantly, 
nonprofessional investors are able to obtain information about the analysts’ recommendations from 
various secondary sources in a digital world (e.g., Yahoo! Finance). The issue is that they are likely 
to obtain such information without being properly informed about the analysts’ COI. Our findings 
suggest that the COI disclosure can be effective in alerting nonprofessional investors when they 
are making short-term investments, and as such, it would be beneficial to make the COI disclosure 
more salient not only in analyst reports but also in other secondary information channels.  
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This study also extends the literature on investment horizon. Investigating how evaluations 
and decisions vary with time horizon has been a central topic in behavioral science (Liberman and 
Trope 2008). Prior accounting research shows that managers’ and institutional investors’ behavior 
can be affected by time horizon (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 2001). The current study adds 
to this stream of research by incorporating investment horizon into the investigation of how 
individual investors process information disclosed by information intermediaries in making 
investment decisions.  
Finally, there is a growing body of behavioral accounting studies that apply CLT to 
examine decision making.5 The current study contributes to the CLT literature by investigating 
how investment-horizon-induced mental construal level influences nonprofessional investors’ 
behaviors. Because investment returns are often realized in the future, investment decisions are 
essentially intertemporal choices. In this sense, CLT is particularly relevant in demonstrating 
investment decisions in accounting since it provides a framework to study intertemporal decision 
making.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present background information 
regarding the mandatory COI disclosures in financial analyst reports and develop the hypotheses 
in the next section. In Section III we elaborate on research methods, followed by a discussion of 
the pretests in Section IV. We discuss results and additional analyses in Section V and conclude 
the paper in Section VI. 
  
                                                 
5 Recently published papers that use CLT as the theoretical underpinning include Elliott, Grant, and Rennekamp (2017), 
Choi, Hecht, Tafkov, and Towry (2016), Elliott, Rennekamp, and White (2015), Rasso (2015), Taylor and Curtis (2013), 
and Koonce, Seybert, and Smith (2011). 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Disclosure of COI in Analyst Reports 
Sell-side analysts face many conflicts of interest (e.g., investment banking fees, trading 
commissions, and favorable access to managers) which can compromise their independence and 
give rise to optimistic biases in stock recommendations (SEC 2010; Schipper 1991; Hong and 
Kubik 2003; O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin 2005). Regulators have long been concerned about 
analysts’ impaired independence caused by their COI. Following a number of SEC investigations 
(Richards 2002), a set of regulatory reforms and enforcement actions were undertaken to tackle 
analysts’ COI, starting with Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  
SOX Section 501 requires registered securities associations and national securities 
exchanges to design and adopt rules to address analysts’ COI and to protect the independence of 
financial analysts. In July 2002, NASD implemented Rule 2711, with the SEC’s approval, to 
require brokers to disclose material COI on the front page of their research reports or provide a 
front-page reference to the page on which such a disclosure could be found. The Global Research 
Analyst Settlement further enhanced the disclosure requirement by mandating each sanctioned 
broker to state on the first page of every research report that it “does and seeks to do business with 
companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may 
have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report.” (SEC 2003).  
Influence of COI Disclosures on Nonprofessional Investors  
Nonprofessional investors are important participants in capital markets. According to the 
Securities Industry and Financial Market Association (2018), roughly 40 percent of U.S. equities 
are held by U.S. households. However, several prior studies reveal that nonprofessional investors 
often underperform by being net buyers of stocks with weak future performance and, therefore, 
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earn poor returns (Barber and Odean 2000; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2000; Barber, Lee, Liu, and 
Odean 2009).  
Regulators' interest in mandating analysts’ disclosure of any COI largely stems from the 
belief that investors, especially nonprofessional investors, may not be fully aware of analysts’ COI 
and, thus, are misled into making suboptimal investments (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2007). 
Although nonprofessional investors do not have the same extensive access to analyst reports as 
professional investors, analyst reports and their stock recommendations have become easily 
accessible to nonprofessional investors through various online sources. Most brokerage firms 
make their research reports and recommendations available to their clients and, in some cases, 
allow clients to download reports from other brokerage firms with which they have partnerships 
(Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007). For example, Merrill Edge, an online broker and part of 
Bank of America's retail banking division, gives account holders access to equity research by 
Morningstar and S&P in addition to Merrill Lynch Global Research. Charles Schwab, another 
online brokerage firm, gives account holders access to equity research by Morningstar and S&P in 
addition to Credit Suisse.  
While nonprofessional investors value analysts’ stock recommendations as important 
advice in making investment decisions (SRI International 1987; Yeen and Hong 2016),6 they tend 
to be unaware of or ignore the fact that analysts’ stock recommendations are potentially 
optimistically biased. For example, Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that individual 
                                                 
6 In the survey report “Into the Minds of Investors: Investors’ View of Financial Reporting, Audit and Corporate 
Governance,” Yeen and Hong (2016) document that 91 percent of the retail investors said that analyst reports are at 
least “somehow important,” and 52 percent of them considered analyst reports “important” or “very important.” In an 
experiment, Asay, Elliott, and Rennekamp (2017) find that investors rely on outside information sources more when 
managers’ disclosure is less readable and most of their participants chose to access financial analyst reports or reports 
summarizing the analyst consensus. Such findings further support the importance of financial analysts reports to the 
individual investors.  
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investors react to stock recommendations made by Jim Cramer, a former hedge fund manager and 
host of the television show Mad Money, resulting in significant overnight returns that are 
subsequently reversed. Evidence from Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) suggests that while 
institutional investors are largely aware of the potential COI faced by affiliated analysts and 
discount the analysts’ stock recommendations accordingly, individual investors appear to follow 
the analysts’ stock recommendations.   
Proponents of mandatory COI disclosures argue that the revelation of the fact that the 
analysts’ interests are not aligned with investors’ interests should generate suspicion of the 
analysts’ recommendations and reduce investors’ overreliance on such information. While the 
mandatory COI disclosure is expected to increase awareness of the analysts’ COI (Fischhoff et al. 
1978), such a disclosure may not exert the intended effect on nonprofessional investors. 
Psychology literature shows that people suffer from a “curse of knowledge” (Fischhoff 1977; 
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber 1989) such that they often fail to sufficiently discount advice 
which is highlighted as potentially biased (Gibbons et al. 1998). Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, Kelly et al. (2012) find that warning participants about the potential bias in analysts’ 
recommendations, combined with instructing them to form their own independent stock 
recommendations, reduces investors’ reliance on analysts’ stock recommendations. However, it is 
not clear whether such a disclosure on its own reduces investors’ reliance on analysts’ 
recommendations, although the authors conjecture that it does not.7  
  
                                                 
7 Findings from Kelly et al. (2012) suggest that warning investors about analysts’ COI is effective in influencing 
investors’ behaviors if the investors exert cognitive effort to form their own stock recommendation. Our study focuses 
on investment horizon and its influence on investors’ construal level that ultimately affects the salience of the COI 
disclosure in the investors’ mindsets. Both studies shed light on the boundary conditions under which the COI 
disclosure would be effective or ineffective in influencing investors’ behaviors.  
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Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon 
We posit that the impact of COI disclosure on investors’ willingness to invest in the 
recommended stock varies with investment horizon. We rely on CLT and its application in the 
field of communication effectiveness to develop our arguments. The central premise of CLT is 
that individuals’ mental representations of objects and events range from a low construal level 
emphasizing peripheral details and secondary features to a high construal level focusing on central 
meaning and primary features (Liberman and Trope 1998; Eyal, Liberman, Trope, and Walther 
2004). It is well established that temporal distance activates different mental construal levels: 
individuals construe near-future events at a low construal level and distant-future events at a high 
construal level (Trope and Liberman 2000; Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002; Eyal et al. 
2004; Herzog, Hansen, and Wänke 2007; Trope, Liberman, Wakslak 2007).  
Temporal distance alters construal levels not only when actual temporal distance varies but 
also when subjective temporal perspectives change (Kivetz and Tyler 2007; Fujita et al. 2008; 
Weisner 2015). While actual temporal distance reflects the difference between the present time 
and a future event, a subjective temporal perspective is a proximal-future- or distal-future-oriented 
time perspective on which individuals make decisions irrespective of the actual event timing.8 For 
example, Rogers and Bazerman (2008) document that, holding constant the actual temporal 
distance from the event to the decision while varying the timing of the outcomes and consequences 
of the event, people are tempted to construe the event at a high (low) level and focus on the high-
level (low-level) features when the consequences occur in the distant future (near future).  
This line of research on subjective temporal perspectives rests on the rationale that an 
individual can be primed to adopt a high or low construal-level mindset that carries over to the 
                                                 
8 See Weisner (2015) for a review with respect to subjective temporal perspectives.  
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mental representation of other objects or events (Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope 2004; Fujita, 
Trope, Liberman, Levin-Sagi 2006). For instance, Kivetz and Tyler (2007) document that when 
individuals are primed to think about themselves in one week (in 10 years), they form a short-term 
(long-term) oriented temporal perspective that influences their subsequent decisions (e.g., 
choosing banks). In the current investment setting, we posit that a short-term (long-term) 
investment horizon entails the consideration of investment returns realized in the near (distant) 
future and should prompt the investors to adopt a proximal (distal) temporal perspective and thus 
a low-level (high-level) construal mindset. That low-level or high-level mindset carries over to the 
subsequent evaluation of available information, which, in our setting, is the analyst report.  
          The follow-up question is how low-level or high-level construal mindsets influence 
investors’ evaluation of analyst reports containing COI disclosures and, consequently, their 
investment decisions. Financial analyst reports are by nature a type of communication that aims to 
influence investors’ decisions. Prior studies show that decision makers tend to put more weight on 
information in line with their construal-level mindsets (Petty and Wegener 1998; Fujita et al. 
2008). This “construal fit” effect has been documented in various communication scenarios, such 
as political campaigns (Kim, Rao, and Lee 2009), advertisements (Hernandez, Wright, and 
Rodrigues 2015), and peer recommendations (Zhao and Xie 2011), where individuals with a 
proximal (distal) temporal perspective are more influenced by information associated with low-
level (high-level) features.  
Based on Trope and Liberman (2010), we posit that a stock recommendation represents the 
relatively central and primary feature of the analyst report while the COI disclosure represents a 
relatively peripheral and secondary feature of the report. Trope and Liberman (2010) propose two 
criteria to assess whether a feature is high-level or low-level: centrality and subordination. 
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Centrality indicates that “changing a high-level feature has a greater impact on the meaning of an 
object than does changing a low-level feature” while subordination means that “the meaning of 
low-level features depends on high-level features more than vice versa” (Trope and Liberman 
2010, 441). The stock recommendation is more central than the COI disclosure, because changing 
the stock recommendation (e.g., from Buy to Sell) essentially alters the advice conveyed by the 
analyst report but changing the COI disclosure does not. In addition, given that the COI disclosure 
points to the potential bias in the stock recommendation, it is only meaningful when the stock 
recommendation is present.  
Given that the COI disclosure represents a relatively peripheral and secondary feature of 
the analyst report, the “construal fit” effect predicts that such disclosure should receive greater 
attention from investors construing at a low level than from those construing at a high level. Short-
term investors with a low-level construal mindset, therefore, are more likely to be influenced by 
the COI disclosure than the long-term investors with a high-level construal mindset. Since the COI 
disclosure aims to alert investors to the potential bias in the analyst report, the disclosure, when 
attended to, should reduce short-term investors’ perception of the credibility of the analyst and the 
research report, which in turn decreases their investment willingness. Hence, we expect the 
presence of a COI disclosure to have a greater impact on lowering investors’ investment intention 
in the recommended stock when the investment horizon is short than when it is long. The predicted 
moderating effect of investment horizon is graphically presented in Panel A of Figure 1. Formally, 
we hypothesize that: 
H1: (Moderation) The presence of a COI disclosure in an analyst report has a larger 
negative effect on investors’ willingness to invest in the recommended stock when 
the investment horizon is shorter.  
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While we rely on the “construal fit” effect and predict that the COI disclosure is more likely 
to influence short-term investors than long-term investors, one might argue that long-term 
investors could be affected by the COI disclosure more because the long holding period leads them 
to perceive themselves as bearing a high risk if analysts act on the COI. Short-term investors, in 
contrast, may perceive the risk to be low because they can get in and out before the COI materializes. 
This argument provides tension for our prediction.  
Psychological Mechanisms: Perceived Trustworthiness and Expertness 
H1 rests on the premise that the COI disclosure influences investors’ investment intention 
by reducing the perceived credibility of the analyst and the research report. Perceived source 
credibility is vital in determining communication effectiveness and it consists of two distinct yet 
related components: perceived trustworthiness and expertness (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland 
et al. 1953; Maddux and Rogers 1980). 9 Numerous studies on communication effectiveness, 
including those applying CLT, demonstrate perceived expertness and trustworthiness as 
underlying mechanisms that mediate how communications affect decision making (e.g., Kelly et 
al. 2012; Steinhart, Carmon, and Trope 2013; Reyt, Wiesenfeld, and Trope 2016).  
COI disclosures have been documented to reduce decision makers’ perception of source 
trustworthiness and expertness. For example, Taha and Petrocelli (2014) find that investors view 
an analyst as less trustworthy if they are informed that the analyst personally holds the 
recommended stock. Cooper and Neuhaus (2000) show that, in the context of legal persuasion, 
jurors tend to discount the expertise of experts testifying in court when the experts are highly paid 
                                                 
9 Perceived expertness refers to the extent to which the information source is perceived to consist of valid assertions; 
perceived trustworthiness refers to the extent to which the communicator is believed to communicate the assertions 
that are considered most valid. Although the two psychological mechanisms are conceptually different, they are closely 
related and often occur simultaneously. As a result, prior studies normally test the two mechanisms together rather 
than separately (Hovland et al. 1953).   
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by the defendants and thus have a COI.  
 We have argued that investment horizon moderates the impact of the COI disclosure on 
investment willingness by activating investors’ different construal-level mindsets that affect the 
attention to COI disclosure, and thus the salience of COI disclosure in investors’ evaluation of 
source credibility. This moderating effect is expected to be mediated by perceived source 
trustworthiness and expertness that underlie individuals’ assessment of source credibility. Figure 
2 shows the overall conceptual model. Specifically, COI disclosure is expected to have a greater 
negative impact on the perceived trustworthiness and expertness of the analyst when investment 
horizon is short than when it is long. Documenting supporting evidence of these two psychological 
mechanisms, and finding evidence consistent with H1, would foster confidence in the CLT-based 
explanation of the moderation of investment horizon. In line with our arguments, we hypothesize 
that:  
H2a: (Mediated moderation) The presence of a COI disclosure has a greater negative 
impact on investors’ perception of the analyst’s trustworthiness when the investment 
horizon is shorter, which mediates the moderating effect of investment horizon on 
the influence of disclosing COI on investors’ investment decisions.  
  
H2b: (Mediated moderation) The presence of a COI disclosure has a greater negative 
impact on investors’ perception of the analyst’s expertness when the investment 
horizon is shorter, which mediates the moderating effect of investment horizon on 
the influence of disclosing COI on investors’ investment decisions. 
 
III. METHOD 
Procedures and Case Materials  
We conducted a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment in which we manipulated the COI 
disclosure in the analyst report (absent vs. present) and the investment horizon (short-term vs. 
long-term).10 Participants were asked to assume the role of an investor seeking either a short-term 
                                                 
10 This research project was approved by the Business and Economics Human Ethics Advisory Group at the University 
of Melbourne. 
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or long-term investment opportunity with an endowment of $10,000. In the experiment, 
participants were first presented with background information of a hypothetical company named 
TecPipe, including a brief introduction to the company and its key accounting information (e.g., 
assets, debt, equity, sales, cost of goods sold, and net income) over the past three years. Similar to 
Kelly et al. (2012), the past accounting information was deliberately designed in a way that the 
company’s future prospect appears uncertain.11  
Participants were then presented with an analyst report about TecPipe issued by JMR 
Capital Market Research, a hypothetical full-service brokerage firm. The analyst rated TecPipe’s 
shares as “Strong Buy” with the COI disclosure either present or absent. After viewing the analyst 
report, participants were asked to indicate their willingness to invest in the stock as well as their 
perception of the trustworthiness and expertness of the analyst and the report issued. Finally, 
participants provided information related to their basic demographics, accounting and financial 
knowledge, and investment experience.  
Participants 
 We recruited participants from MTurk.12 Two prescreening questions were designed to 
                                                 
11 The past accounting information shows an improving financial position (e.g., more assets and lower financial 
leverage) accompanied by a worsening financial performance (e.g., lower profits), which should make the company’s 
financial outlook uncertain. We ran an additional test to confirm whether participants indeed perceived the company’s 
future prospect as uncertain. Sixty-four Mturkers were recruited and shown the company profile and accounting 
information used in the main experiment. They were asked to answer two questions. The first question asked the 
participants to indicate whether the financial position and performance of TecPipe was deteriorating or improving on 
a 9-point scale (1 = definitely deteriorating, 9 = definitely improving). The second question asked the participants to 
rate the extent to which, on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree), they agreed with the statement 
that TecPipe’s future prospects appear uncertain based on its past accounting information. Responses to the first 
question show that participants were unsure about the company’s financial position and performance as the mean is 
not statistically different from the midpoint of 5 (mean = 5.156 vs. 5; t = 0.662; p = 0.510). Responses to the second 
question indicate that the extent to which participants agreed with the statement about TecPipe’s uncertain future 
prospects is significantly greater than the midpoint (mean = 6.063 vs. 5; t = 3.364; p < 0.001). Taken together, results 
from this additional experiment confirm that the materials and accounting information used in our main experiment 
make TecPipe’s future prospect uncertain.  
12 As an online labor market, MTurk has become a popular source for recruiting participants for experimental research 
in recent years (e.g., Rennekamp 2012; Koonce et al. 2015). Farrell et al. (2017) provide evidence supporting the use 
of MTurk in experimental accounting research. 
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exclude non-investors: “Do you have experience in investing in stock or debt markets?” and “Do 
you plan on investing in stock markets in the future?” Participants who answered negatively to 
both questions were not permitted to continue the experiment. We received 551 participants who 
passed the screening questions. We excluded 16 responses that had duplicate IP address and 3 
participants provided false demographic information. We also excluded 26 responses who passed 
the prescreening and provided usable responses but were not located in the U.S. or self-identified 
as non-native English speakers. This results in a final sample of 506 participants.  
 To further confirm the validity of using MTurkers in our setting, we analyzed the 
background information of the 506 participants. The average (median) age is 37 (33) years old, 
and they have an average (median) of 15.25 (12) years of full-time work experience. On average, 
participants have completed 2.20 accounting and 2.17 finance courses, and 73 percent of them held 
a bachelor’s degree or higher. Regarding their investment experience, 85 percent of the participants 
had invested in stock or debt markets and 70 percent had consulted analysts’ stock 
recommendations for evaluating investment potential. Taken together, those participants share 
similar investment experience and knowledge in accounting and finance to Mturkers recruited by 
Rennekamp (2012) and to first-year MBA students in Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk (2007), 
suggesting that participants in our study are representative of nonprofessional investors. 
Independent Variables 
To manipulate the COI disclosure, participants in the COI-present (DISCLOSURE= 1) 
condition were shown the following statement:  
 “JMR Capital Market Research does and seeks to do business with companies covered in 
its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict 
of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report and investors should consider this 
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report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.”  
This wording was adapted from real-world analyst reports and is consistent with the requirement 
in the Global Research Analyst Settlement. Participants in the COI-absent (DISCLOSURE = 0) 
condition were not shown the above disclosure.  
To manipulate the investment horizon, participants in the short-term investment (ST) 
condition (HORIZON = 0) were instructed at the beginning of the experiment to assume that they 
were considering a short-term investment and that they expected to hold the stock for no more 
than one week. Participants in the long-term investment (LT) condition (HORIZON = 1) were 
asked to assume that they were considering a long-term investment and that they expected to hold 
the stock for no less than one year.  
Measure of Primary Dependent Variable 
Our primary dependent variable is investors’ willingness to invest in the recommended 
stock which was measured by three questions similar to Elliott et al. (2017). The first two questions 
asked participants to rate (1) the attractiveness of TecPipe’s stock (1 = not attractive at all, 9 = very 
attractive) and (2) the likelihood that they will invest in TecPipe’s stock (1 = very unlikely, 9 = 
very likely). The third question asked participants to indicate the amount, up to $10,000, that they 
would like to invest in TecPipe’s stock. The Cronbach’s α for the three items (standardized) was 
0.887, confirming the internal consistency. We performed a principal component analysis (PCA) 
of those three items and took the first principal component as the measure of investors’ willingness 
to invest (INVESTMENT).13 Panel A of Table 1 provides detailed descriptions of these questions.  
  
                                                 
13 We use PCA to combine the three items rather than taking the average because the units of measurement differ 
across the three items. The Eigenvalue of the first component from PCA is 2.455.  
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Measures of Psychological Mechanisms 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Hovland et al. 1953), source credibility was captured 
by its two dimensions: perceived trustworthiness and expertness. Three questions adapted from 
prior studies (e.g., Fuller, Serva, and Benamati 2007; Elliott, Hodge, and Sedor 2012) measured 
perceived trustworthiness: (1) “In your opinion, how trustworthy is the analyst report?” (1 = not 
trustworthy at all, 9 = very trustworthy), (2) “In your opinion, how reliable is the analyst report?” 
(1 = not reliable at all, 9 = very reliable), and (3) “Do you trust the Strong Buy recommendation 
in the analyst report about TecPipe?” (1 = do not trust it at all, 9 = trust it very much). The three 
questions (Cronbach’s α = 0.963) were averaged to measure perceived trustworthiness 
(TRUSTWORTHINESS). 
Following prior literature (Loh and Stulz 2011; Boivie, Graffin, and Gentry 2016), three 
questions measured perceived expertness: (1) “Please assess the expertise of the financial analyst 
who prepared the report about TecPipe” (1 = very low expertise, 9 = very high expertise), (2) “In 
your opinion, how informative is the analyst report?” (1 = not informative at all, 9 = very 
informative), and (3) “In your opinion, how persuasive is the analyst report?” (1 = not persuasive 
at all, 9 = very persuasive). The three items (Cronbach’s α = 0.861) were averaged to measure 
perceived expertness (EXPERTNESS).  
IV. PRETEST EXPERIMENTS 
We conducted two pretests to: (1) validate the time-horizon manipulation (i.e., whether 
holding stocks for less than one week or more than one year is indeed considered a short-term or 
long-term investment, respectively) and (2) confirm whether the consideration of short-term versus 
long-term investment horizon activates a low-level versus high-level construal mindset.  
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Pretest 1: Verifying Time-Horizon Manipulation 
Eighty-two MTurkers were recruited and randomly assigned into the ST (n = 40) and LT 
(n = 42) conditions. Consistent with the main experiment, we informed the participants that, “You 
should assume the role of an investor who has $10,000 to invest and you are searching for 
opportunities to make a short-term (long-term) investment, which you plan to hold for less than 
one week (more than one year).” Following Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, and Bettman (2009), the 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt about the investment horizon on three 9-point 
scales (1 = very short, 9 = very long; 1 = very instant, 9 = very distant; 1 = very near, 9 = very far). 
The three scales (Cronbach’s α = 0.960) were averaged to measure the participants’ subjective 
temporal perception. Results indicate that participants in the LT condition perceive a significantly 
longer investment horizon than those in the ST condition (LT mean = 4.452 vs. ST mean = 2.600; 
t = -4.450; p < 0.001),14 suggesting the validation of the investment horizon manipulation. 
Pretest 2: Verifying Construal Levels 
 We rely on Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) Behavior Identification Form (BIF) 
questionnaire to assess whether instructing participants to make a ST (LT) investment triggers a 
low-level (high-level) construal mindset. The BIF questionnaire has been widely used to evaluate 
mental construal levels (Burgoon, Henderson, and Markman 2013). To facilitate comparison with 
the BIF scores documented in prior studies, we employ the BIF questionnaire adapted from 
Liberman and Trope (1998), containing 19 common-life activities that are described in two distinct 
ways, representing either a high-level or low-level construal feature.15 For instance, the activity 
                                                 
14 All p-values in this study are two-tailed or two-tailed equivalents. 
15  The original BIF questionnaire (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) contains 25 questions. The questionnaire used in 
Liberman and Trope (1998) exclude the following six activities: "joining the army," "picking an apple," "chopping 
down a tree," "voting," "climbing a tree," and "growing a garden." Our interpretation remained unchanged when 
including responses to these activities in the analysis. 
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“making a list” is described as either “getting organized” (a high-level description) or “writing 
things down” (a low-level description). Participants were asked to choose the one that best reflects 
their view. Selections of the high-level (low-level) descriptions reflect a high-level (low-level) 
construal mindset. 
Eighty MTurkers were recruited and randomly assigned into the ST (n = 39) or LT (n = 
41) conditions. We used the materials described previously. Participants were asked to assume the 
role of an investor who is searching for opportunities to make a short-term (long-term) investment 
and expects to hold the investment for less than one week (more than one year). We then asked 
the participants to answer the BIF questionnaire, instructing them to keep in mind that the 
investment horizon was short-term or long-term. Following Liberman and Trope (1998), each 
high-level and low-level construal response was scored as 1 and 0, and the 19 scores were summed 
to measure each participant’s construal-level mindset, with a greater value indicating a higher-
level construal mindset.  
Results show that the construal-level score in the LT condition is significantly higher than 
that in the ST condition (LT mean = 12.244 vs. ST mean = 9.974; t = 1.966; p = 0.053), indicating 
that participants in the LT condition hold a higher-level construal mindset than participants in the 
ST condition. The construal-level scores in the LT and ST conditions are similar to those reported 
in Liberman and Trope’s (1998) distant future (13.44) and near future (10.19) conditions. Thus, 
Pretest 2 confirms that the short (long) investment horizon activates a low-level (high-level) 
construal mindset.  
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V. RESULTS 
Attention Checks 
One concern with recruiting participants using crowdsourcing websites for experimental 
studies is data quality (Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014), which we tried to mitigate with 
attention check questions. Following Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, and Acquisti (2017), we asked 
participants to indicate on a 9-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with: (1) “I have never used the Internet myself” and (2) “I 
currently don’t pay attention to the questions I am being asked in the survey” and only the choice 
of “strongly disagree” was considered as passing the attention checks.  
To avoid the attention checks being so obvious that even inattentive participants would 
notice, we intentionally surrounded attention check questions with four dummy questions. 16 
Furthermore, to avoid disrupting the survey flow and to mitigate the possibility that attentive 
participants could take offense at the attention checks and react by providing outright wrong 
answers (Peer et al. 2014), we presented the attention check questions after collecting responses 
on the main variables. In total, 71 out of 506 responses failed the attention checks and were 
dropped from the analyses, leaving 435 responses in the sample. 
Manipulation Checks 
To ensure that participants attended to our manipulation of the investment horizon and the 
COI disclosure in the analyst report, we asked participants to identify whether a disclosure of COI 
                                                 
16 More specifically, on the screen showing the attention check questions, we also listed the following questions: (1) 
“To what extent are you concerned that the Strong Buy stock recommendation about TecPipe is optimistically biased?”, 
(2) “To what extent are you worried about your investment in TecPipe if you follow the Strong Buy stock 
recommendation?”, (3) “In your opinion, how honest is the analyst report about TecPipe?”, and (4) “In your opinion, 
how honest is the analyst who prepared the analyst report about TecPipe?” These four dummy questions were similar 
to those questions that participants would have seen on previous screens. We asked the first attention check question 
after showing the second dummy question, and the second attention check question after showing the fourth dummy 
question.  
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was presented in the analyst report and whether they were instructed to make a short-term or a 
long-term investment. Of the 435 participants who passed the attention checks, 70 participants 
failed either one or both manipulation checks and were dropped. This results in 365 responses for 
our hypotheses testing.17  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 Panel B show that the presence of the COI disclosure 
decreases INVESTMENT, TRUSTWORTHINESS, and EXPERTNESS in the ST conditions. In 
comparison, while INVESTMENT also decreases from the COI-absent condition to the COI-
present condition when the investment horizon is long, the magnitude of the decrease is very small. 
TRUSTWORTHINESS and EXPERTNESS do not change much across COI-present and COI-
absent conditions when the investment horizon is long. Overall, the patterns appearing in the 
descriptive statistics are consistent with our predictions.  
Test of H1 
             H1 predicts that investment horizon moderates the effect of COI disclosure on investors’ 
willingness to invest in the recommended stock. Table 2 Panel A summarizes the ANOVA results 
on INVESTMENT. Results show a significant DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction (F1,361 = 
5.723; p = 0.017), consistent with our prediction in H1. As shown in the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1 Panel B, in the ST conditions, the mean of INVESTMENT is -0.742 with the presence of a 
COI disclosure and 0.378 when the COI disclosure is absent. Table 2 Panel B reports the simple 
effects and shows that the difference is statistically significant (F1,179 = 22.806; p < 0.001), 
suggesting that the presence of a COI disclosure significantly decreases investors’ willingness to 
                                                 
17 Our results remain similar if we retain the responses of participants who did not pass the manipulation checks. Our 
inferences also remain unchanged if we use all 506 responses in the analyses. Further details are given when we 
discuss results of hypothesis testing. 
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invest when their investment horizon is short. In comparison, in the LT conditions, the mean of 
INVESTMENT is -0.087 with the presence of a COI disclosure and 0.268 when the COI disclosure 
is absent. The difference is not statistically significant (F1,182 = 2.653; p = 0.105), indicating that 
disclosing COI in the analyst report does not significantly alter investors’ willingness to invest 
when their investment horizon is long.18 The significant interaction effect is also depicted in Panel 
B of Figure 1. Overall, the results presented in Table 2 support the moderating effect of investment 
horizon on the influence of the COI disclosure on the investors’ investment intention.19  
Test of H2  
H2a and H2b predict that investment horizon moderates the effectiveness of COI 
disclosures by affecting investors’ perception of trustworthiness and expertness (Hovland et al. 
1953). Table 3 reports the results of the mediated moderation analysis following Hayes (2013).20 
Consistent with our expectations, results in Table 3 Panel A show that the coefficient on the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction is significantly different from zero (coefficient = 0.873; 
95% confidence interval = [0.032, 1.713]), indicating that the effect of DISCLOSURE on 
                                                 
18 Since we do not have a directional prediction on the simple effect of DISCLOSURE on INVESTMENT, we rely on 
the two-tailed equivalent p-value to determine the statistical significance. We note that if we employ the one-tailed 
equivalent p-value, the effect of DISCLOSURE on INVESTMENT becomes marginally significant when the 
investment horizon is long. However, the statistical significance of the simple effect does not affect our main inference 
with respect to the moderating effect of investment horizon. To corroborate our ANOVA findings, we further calculate 
and compare partial eta-squared across the ST and LT conditions. The partial eta-squared is 0.113 given short 
investment horizon and 0.014 given long investment horizon, suggesting that the magnitude of the effect of 
DISCLOSURE on INVESTMENT is much larger when the investment horizon is short than when the investment 
horizon is long.   
19 There might be a concern that our results are driven by long-term investors paying less attention to the analyst report. 
To test this possibility, we recruited 80 MTurkers and randomly assigned them into short-term versus long-term 
horizon conditions and showed them the materials (without the COI disclosure) that were used in the main experiment. 
After they answered the questions related to willingness to invest, we asked them to indicate (1) the stock 
recommendation they saw (“Strong Buy”, “Hold”, or “Underperform”), (2) the stock exchange on which TecPipe is 
listed (“New York Stock Exchange”, “London Stock Exchange”, or “Hong Kong Stock Exchange”), and (3) the 
analyst’s expectation of TecPipe’s earnings growth (“Strong”, “Flat”, or “Weak”). Correct responses to each question 
average 93 percent for participants in the long-term condition and 96 percent for participants in the short-term 
condition. The correct rates are similar between long-term and short-term conditions (χ2 = 0.828; p = 0.363). Therefore, 
our finding is unlikely to be driven by long-term investors paying less attention to the information than short-term 
investors. 
20 More specifically, we use Model 8 in Hayes (2013) with bootstrapping of 5,000 iterations. 
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TRUSTWORTHINESS varies with HORIZON. Similarly, in Table 3 Panel B, the coefficient on the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction is significantly different from zero (coefficient = 0.854; 
95% confidence interval = [0.115, 1.593]), suggesting that the effect of DISCLOSURE on 
EXPERTNESS also varies with HORIZON. In Table 3 Panel C, the coefficient on the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction is not significant since 0 is included in the 95% confidence 
interval, suggesting that after controlling for TRUSTWORTHINESS and EXPERTNESS, the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction has no statistically significant direct effect on 
INVESTMENT. More importantly, as shown in Table 3 Panel D, the indirect effects of the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on INVESTMENT through TRUSTWORTHINESS and 
EXPERTNESS are 0.385 and 0.137, respectively.21 Both indirect effects are statistically significant, 
as the 95% bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals do not include 0.22  
Overall, results presented in Table 3 suggest that investors’ perceptions of trustworthiness 
and expertness mediate the interaction effect of investment horizon and COI disclosure on 
investors’ willingness to invest in the recommended stock. For short-term investments, the 
presence of a COI disclosure significantly reduces investors’ perception of source trustworthiness 
and expertness, which in turn decreases their willingness to invest in the recommended stock. For 
long-term investments, the presence of a COI disclosure does not significantly affect perceived 
                                                 
21  The indirect effect of the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction as mediated by TRUSTWORTHINESS is 
calculated as the coefficient (0.873) on the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction in Panel A multiplied by the 
coefficient (0.441) on TRUSTWORTHINESS in Panel C (0.873 × 0.441 = 0.385). Similarly, the indirect effect of the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction as mediated by EXPERTNESS is calculated as the coefficient (0.854) on the 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction in Panel B multiplied by the coefficient (0.160) on EXPERTNESS in Panel C 
(0.854 × 0.160 = 0.137). 
22 Our inferences remain unchanged if we use the sample that includes participants who failed the manipulation checks 
(n = 435). The indirect effects of the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on INVESTMENT as mediated by 
TRUSTWORTHINESS is 0.348 and by EXPERTNESS is 0.155, both significant at p < 0.05. Our inferences remain 
unchanged if we include participants who failed manipulation checks and attention checks (n = 482). The indirect 
effects of the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on INVESTMENT as mediated by TRUSTWORTHINESS is 
0.293 (p < 0.10) and by EXPERTNESS is 0.131 (p < 0.05).  
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trustworthiness and expertness, and thus, does not alter investors’ willingness to invest.  
Additional Analyses  
Participants’ Investment Experience 
 Prior studies show that investors’ competence influences their investing behaviors 
(Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2009). Therefore, nonprofessional investors’ general experience in 
investing in equity and/or debt markets, as well as their familiarity with analyst research might 
also influence the moderating effect of investment horizon on the effectiveness of COI disclosures. 
Ceteris paribus, investors with relatively extensive investment experience and familiarity with the 
analyst research are likely to understand the COI better, which helps them to form a reasonable 
assessment about how the COI will affect the analysts’ forecasting behaviors. While this 
expectation is plausible, prior research in psychology also finds that experience does not 
necessarily influence individuals’ responses to the COI disclosures (Cain et al. 2005). As a result, 
it is not clear, ex-ante, how investment experience would influence our results.  
 To shed light on the issue, we asked participants to rate how frequently they invest in equity 
and debt markets (1 = never, 9 = with high frequency). Ratings above 5 (44 percent; median split) 
are coded as high in investment experience (EXPERIENCE = 1) and those equal to or below 5 are 
coded as low in investment experience (EXPERIENCE = 0). The three-way ANOVA 
(DISCLOSURE × HORIZON × EXPERIENCE) reveals a significant DISCLOSURE × HORIZON 
interaction effect (F1,357 = 4.610; p = 0.033). However, neither the main effect of experience (F1,357 
= 0.595; p = 0.441) nor the three-way interaction (F1,357 = 0.496; p = 0.482) are statistically 
significant. This suggests that general experience in making investments in capital markets does 
not influence the moderating effect of investment horizon on the relationship between the COI 
disclosure and investors’ investing behaviors.  
 26 
 To test the potential influence of investors’ familiarity with analyst research, we asked 
participants to indicate how many times they had evaluated a company’s investment potential by 
consulting analysts’ stock recommendations (1 = first time, 2 = 1-5 times, 3 = 6+ times). We coded 
those who answered “3” as being familiar in using analyst equity research (FAMILIARITY = 1). 
The three-way ANOVA (DISCLOSURE × HORIZON × FAMILIARITY) shows a significant two-
way interaction for DISCLOSURE × HORIZON (F1,357 = 4.155; p = 0.042) and an insignificant 
three-way interaction DISCLOSURE × HORIZON × FAMILIARITY (F1,357 = 0.124; p = 0.724). 
Hence, having prior experience in consulting analysts’ stock recommendations does not alter the 
moderating effect of investment horizon on the effectiveness of COI disclosures. 
Analysis of Alternative Psychological Mechanisms 
Prior literature suggests that investors’ investment decisions could be influenced by two 
other psychological mechanisms: confidence and optimism (Barber and Odean 1999; Puri and 
Robinson 2007; Ciccone 2011; Aspara 2013). Confidence and optimism can also be affected by 
construal levels (Tsai and McGill 2011; Weinstein, 1980) and negative information (e.g., 
cautionary notices; Griffin and Tversky 1992; Koonce, Leitter, and White 2018) which are related 
to investment horizon and COI disclosure in our research setting. Therefore, we performed an 
additional analysis to probe the possibility that confidence and optimism are two alternative 
psychological mechanisms underlying the moderating effect of investment horizon on the 
relationship between the COI disclosure and investment decisions.  
Unlike perceived trustworthiness and expertness which measure investors’ perception of 
the analyst and the research report, confidence and optimism pertain to the investors’ feelings 
about their investments. Participants were asked two questions about how confident and optimistic 
they were about their investments on a 9-point scale. Table 1 Panel C reports the descriptive 
statistics of CONFIDENCE and OPTIMISM by each condition. We conduct analogous 
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bootstrapping analyses to test the potential mediating effects of confidence and optimism. Results 
(untabulated) rule out confidence and optimism as alternative psychological mechanisms 
underlying our main findings. In particular, regression results suggest an insignificant influence of 
the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on CONFIDENCE (coefficient = -0.432; p = 0.311). 
However, in the regression of INVESTMENT, the coefficient on the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON 
interaction remains significant (coefficient = 0.914; p = 0.002) after including CONFIDENCE. 
The indirect effect of the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on INVESTMENT through 
CONFIDENCE is not statistically different from 0 (95% confidence interval = [-0.449, 0.140]). A 
similar pattern is observed for OPTIMISM. The coefficient on the DISCLOSURE×HORIZON 
interaction is insignificant (coefficient = 0.265; p = 0.540) in the regression of OPTIMISM but 
statistically significant (coefficient = 0.644; p = 0.011) in the regression of INVESTMENT after 
including OPTIMISM. The indirect effect of the DISCLOSURE × HORIZON interaction on 
INVESTMENT through OPTIMISM is not statistically significant (95% confidence interval = [-
0.259, 0.526]). Taken together, confidence and optimism are unlikely to be alternative 
psychological processes that drive our main findings. 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Educating investors and protecting them from financial analysts’ COI has been a 
formidable challenge for regulators of capital markets (Richards 2002; SEC 2010). The mandatory 
COI disclosure promulgated by a series of regulatory reforms around 2002 (i.e., NASD Rule 2711, 
NYSE Rule 472 and the Global Settlement) is widely considered to be a critical step in this 
direction (Kelly et al. 2012). However, evidence is limited on whether such disclosures effectively 
alert individual investors to the potential optimistic bias in analysts’ stock recommendations and 
hence influence the investors’ behaviors.  
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The current study finds that the effect of COI disclosure on investors’ investment decisions 
depends on the investors’ intended investment horizon. Specifically, the COI disclosure reduces 
investors’ willingness to invest in a recommended stock when the investors are making short-term 
investments but does not alter willingness to invest when investors are making long-term 
investments. Our findings further suggest that the investors’ perception of source trustworthiness 
and expertness are the underlying psychological mechanisms that mediate the moderating role of 
investment horizon.  
Our results hold implications for studies investigating investors’ reactions to disclosures, a 
central topic in accounting research. The moderating effect of investment horizon on the 
effectiveness of COI disclosures, as documented in our study, is important because investors 
cannot avoid considering investment horizon when making investment decisions in capital 
markets. Studies incorporating investment horizon into investors’ decision making should 
contribute to a better understanding of the economic consequences of disclosures.  
A recent working paper by White (2017) parallels our work. He studies fair value estimates 
and hypothesizes that the recorded estimate is the higher-level central feature while the Level 2 or 
Level 3 footnote uncertainty disclosure is the lower-level peripheral feature. Consistent with CLT, 
he finds that investors with a short-term, but not a long-term, investment horizon respond more 
negatively to increased uncertainty in Level 3 compared to Level 2 disclosures. While White 
(2017) examines an accounting measurement issue, we focus on third-party investment advice and 
the credibility of information providers. These two studies complement each other and collectively 
demonstrate that investment horizon is an important factor that affects investors’ information 
processing, judgment and decision making. 
There are two potential limitations in our study. First, we only focus on favorable stock 
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recommendation, as it is the most common type of recommendation. It would be insightful for 
future research to study boundary conditions of COI disclosures in the scenario of unfavorable 
recommendations. Second, our instrument presented the COI disclosure on the first page of an 
analyst report, which appears to be relatively forthcoming. Therefore, our findings may not extend 
to scenarios in which the COI disclosures are presented at the end of reports in a small font, as 
some investment banks do. We also leave examination of this possibility to future research. 
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Figure 1 
Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon on the Relationship between Disclosing Conflicts 
of Interest and Willingness to Invest 
 
Panel A: Hypothesized Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon  
 
 
Panel B: Observed Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon  
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Note: Panel A graphically depicts the hypothesized moderating effect of investment horizon on the relationship 
between disclosing conflicts of interests and willingness to invest. Panel B presents a plot of the results testing H1 
regarding the moderating effect of investment horizon. The x-axis indicates whether the COI disclosure is absent or 
present, and the y-axis indicates investors’ willingness to invest. The two lines represent short-term and long-term 
investment horizon conditions, respectively. See note in Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Figure 2 
Conceptual Model for Hypotheses Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure presents the conceptual framework for hypotheses development. H1 predicts a moderating effect 
of Investment Horizon on the impact that COI Disclosure has on Investment. H2a and H2b predict that Perceived 
Trustworthiness and Perceived Expertness mediate the moderation effect of Investment Horizon on the relationship 
between COI Disclosure and Investment.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Questions Used to Measure INVESTMENT, TRUSTWORTHINESS, and 
EXPERTNESS 
 
INVESTMENT 
Q1 In your opinion, how attractive is TecPipe’s stock as an investment?  (1 = not attractive at all, 9 = very attractive) 
Q2 In your opinion, how likely are you to invest in TecPipe’s stock?  (1 = very unlikely, 9 = very likely) 
Q3 Of the $10,000 that you have for investment purposes, please indicate the amount that you would like to invest in TecPipe’s stock. 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Q4 In your opinion, how trustworthy is the analyst report about TecPipe? (1 = not trustworthy at all, 9 = very trustworthy) 
Q5 In your opinion, how reliable is the analyst report about TecPipe? (1 = not reliable at all, 9 = very reliable) 
Q6 Do you trust the Strong Buy recommendation in the analyst report about TecPipe? (1 = do not trust it at all, 9 = trust it very much) 
EXPERTNESS 
Q7 
Please assess the expertise of the financial analyst who prepared the analyst report 
about TecPipe.  
(1 = very low expertise, 9 = very high expertise) 
Q8 In your opinion, how informative is the analyst report about TecPipe? (1 = not informative at all, 9 = very informative) 
Q9 In your opinion, how persuasive is the analyst report about TecPipe? (1 = not persuasive at all, 9 = very persuasive) 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Main Analyses 
 
  Experiment Condition (DISCLOSURE × HORIZON) 
 COI-Absent  COI-Present COI-Absent  COI-Present 
 Short Term  Short Term  Long Term Long Term 
  n = 100 n = 81 n = 108 n = 76 
Q1 6.240 4.753 6.204 5.645 
 [1.955] [2.142] [1.858] [1.916] 
Q2 5.920 4.333 5.907 5.342 
 [2.259] [2.280] [2.181] [2.284] 
Q3 3792.360 2518.185 3345.157 3136.224 
 [2653.550] [2365.067] [2383.698] [2214.368] 
INVESTMENT  0.378 -0.742 0.268 -0.087 
 [1.542] [1.604] [1.443] [1.471] 
Q4  5.910 4.185 5.917 5.053 
 [1.891] [2.174] [1.939] [2.122] 
Q5 5.920 4.222 5.843 5.026 
 [1.942] [2.214] [1.987] [2.097] 
Q6 6.000 4.247 5.759 4.882 
 [2.118] [2.411] [2.208] [2.233] 
TRUSTWORTHINESS  5.943 4.218 5.840 4.987 
 [1.902] [2.210] [1.945] [2.067] 
Q7 6.360 5.753 6.370 6.158 
 [1.726] [1.729] [1.700] [1.609] 
Q8 5.990 4.914 5.889 5.684 
 [1.977] [2.169] [2.115] [1.947] 
Q9 6.000 4.691 5.657 5.645 
 [2.170] [2.396] [2.280] [2.249] 
EXPERTNESS  6.117 5.119 5.972 5.829 
 [1.838] [1.758] [1.808] [1.668] 
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Additional Analyses 
 
  Experiment Condition (DISCLOSURE × HORIZON) 
 COI-Absent  COI-Present COI-Absent  COI-Present 
 Short Term  Short Term  Long Term Long Term 
  n = 100 n = 81 n = 108 n = 76 
EXPERIENCE 0.390 0.444 0.472 0.474 
 [0.490] [0.500] [0.502] [0.503] 
FAMILIARITY 0.300 0.346 0.333 0.329 
 [0.461] [0.479] [0.474] [0.473] 
CONFIDENCE 6.100 5.802 6.269 5.539 
 [2.003] [2.255] [1.796] [2.036] 
OPTIMISM 6.470 5.716 6.620 6.132 
 [1.946] [2.320] [1.903] [2.055] 
  
 
Note: Panel A of this table presents the questions used to measure willingness to invest, perceived trustworthiness, 
and perceived expertness. Panel B of this table tabulates the descriptive statistics of the responses to the questions and 
the measures. Panel C of this table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the additional analyses. In 
Panel B and Panel C, numbers reported are mean values, and standard deviations are presented in brackets. The cell 
size is smaller in the Long-Term COI-present condition due to a relatively higher failure rate of the manipulation 
check of COI disclosure. Detailed variable definitions are as follows.  
DISCLOSURE = presence or absence of the COI disclosure. This variable is coded 1 for experiment conditions where 
the COI disclosure is presented, and 0 for experiment conditions where the COI disclosure is absent.  
HORIZON = investment horizon. This variable is coded 1 for experiment conditions where the investment horizon is 
long, and 0 for experiment conditions where the investment horizon is short. 
INVESTMENT = investors’ willingness to invest. We perform a principal component analysis of the responses to 
Q1, Q2, and Q3, and take the first principal component as the measure of investors’ willingness to invest. 
TRUSTWORTHINESS = perceived trustworthiness. We take the average of the responses to Q4, Q5, and Q6 as the 
measure of perceived trustworthiness. 
EXPERTNESS = perceived expertness. We take the average of the responses to Q7, Q8, and Q9 as the measure of 
perceived expertness. 
EXPERIENCE = investors’ investment experience. We asked participants to rate on a 9-point scale how frequently 
they invest in equity and debt markets. We code ratings above 5 as high experience (EXPERIENCE = 1) and the rest 
as low experience (EXPERIENCE = 0). 
FAMILIARITY = investors’ familiarity with analyst research. We asked participants to indicate how many times they 
had evaluated a company’s investment potential by consulting analysts’ stock recommendations (1 = first time, 2 = 1 
-5 times, 3 = 6+ times). We code participants who answered “3” as being familiar with analyst equity research 
(FAMILIARITY =1) and the rest as unfamiliar with analyst equity research (FAMILIARITY = 0).  
CONFIDENCE = investors’ confidence in their investments. We asked participants to indicate on a 9-point scale 
how confident they were about their investments and we use their responses to measure this variable. 
OPTIMISM = investors’ optimism about their investments. We asked participants to indicate on a 9-point scale how 
optimistic they were about their investments and we use their responses to measure this variable. 
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Table 2 
Moderating Effect of Investment Horizon 
 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Model of INVESTMENT 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F-statistic p-value 
DISCLOSURE 48.631 1 48.631 21.244 <0.001 
HORIZON 6.628 1 6.628 2.895 0.090 
DISCLOSURE × HORIZON (H1) 13.101 1 13.101 5.723 0.017 
Error 826.364 361 2.289     
 
 
Panel B: Simple Effects of COI Disclosure on INVESTMENT 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F-statistic p-value 
Effect of DISCLOSURE given short investment horizon 56.197 1 56.197 22.806 <0.001 
Effect of DISCLOSURE given long investment horizon 5.616 1 5.616 2.653 0.105 
 
 
Note: This table presents the ANOVA results for testing the moderating effect of investment horizon on the effect of 
the COI disclosure on investors’ willingness to invest in the recommended stock (H1). See note in Table 1 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 3 
Mediated Moderating Effects of TRUSTWORTHINESS and EXPERTNESS 
 
Panel A: Regression of TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
 Coef. S.E. t-stat p-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Constant 5.943 0.202 29.412 <0.001 [5.546, 6.341] 
DISCLOSURE -1.725 0.302 -5.711 <0.001 [-2.319, -1.131] 
HORIZON -0.104 0.280 -0.370 0.711 [-0.655, 0.448] 
DISCLOSURE×HORIZON 0.873 0.428 2.041 0.042 [0.032, 1.713] 
R-squared = 0.106, MSE = 4.083, F-stat = 14.265, df1 = 3, df2 = 361, p-value <0.001 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regression of EXPERTNESS 
 
 Coef. S.E. t-stat p-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Constant 6.117 0.178 34.419 <0.001 [5.767, 6.466] 
DISCLOSURE -0.997 0.266 -3.754 <0.001 [-1.520, -0.475] 
HORIZON -0.144 0.247 -0.586 0.558 [-0.629, 0.341] 
DISCLOSURE×HORIZON 0.854 0.376 2.272 0.024 [0.115, 1.593] 
R-squared = 0.043, MSE = 3.158, F-stat = 5.362, df1 = 3, df2 = 361, p-value = 0.001 
 
 
Panel C: Regression of INVESTMENT 
 
 Coef. S.E. t-stat p-value 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Constant -3.223 0.212 -15.199 <0.001 [-3.640, -2.806] 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.441 0.041 10.818 <0.001 [0.361, 0.522] 
EXPERTNESS 0.160 0.046 3.447 0.001 [0.069, 0.251] 
DISCLOSURE -0.200 0.159 -1.258 0.209 [-0.512, 0.113] 
HORIZON -0.042 0.141 -0.295 0.768 [-0.319, 0.236] 
DISCLOSURE×HORIZON 0.244 0.217 1.127 0.261 [-0.182, 0.670] 
R-squared = 0.585, MSE = 1.033, F-stat = 101.161, df1 = 5, df2 = 359, p-value <0.001 
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Panel D: Indirect Effect of Highest Order Product (DISCLOSURE × HORIZON) 
 
Mediator Effect S.E.  
(bootstrapped) 
95% Confidence Interval 
(bootstrapped) 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 0.385 0.192 [0.036, 0.797] 
EXPERTNESS 0.137 0.079 [0.026, 0.347] 
 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results for testing the mediating effect of perceived trustworthiness and 
expertness on the moderating effect of investment horizon on the effectiveness of COI disclosure in affecting 
investment willingness (H2a and H2b). The regressions are performed using Model 8 in Hayes (2013) with 
bootstrapping of 5,000 iterations. See note in Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
